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Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; S.138 ---- Complaint petition was filed by Shri V. Shankar claimed to be General Power of Attorney holder of the Complainant company ----- Subsequently PW 1 Shri Ravinder Singh gave the evidence on behalf of the Company under the General Power of Attorney given by the Complainant Company ------ The Complaint was not signed either by the Managing Director or Director of the Company ----- It is also not in dispute that PW 1 is only the employee of the Company ----- As per Resolution of the Company Managing Director and Director are authorized to file suits and criminal complaints against the debtors for recovery of money and for prosecution ------ Under third part of the said resolution they were authorized to appoint or nominate any other person to appear on their behalf in the Court and engage lawyer etc ------ But nothing on record suggest that an employee is empowered to file the complaint on behalf of the Company ------ Managing Director and Director are authorized persons of the Company to file the complaint by signing and by giving evidence ----- At best the said persons can nominate any person to represent themselves or the Company before the Court ------ In the present case one Shri Shankar Prasad employee of the Company signed the complaint and the Deputy General Manager of the Company i.e. PW-1 gave evidence as if he knows everything though he does not know anything ------ There is nothing on the record to suggest that he was authorized by the Managing Director or any Director ------ Acquittal of the Accused confirmed.

Limitation to file claim for due maintenance – Considering the peculiar circumstances of the case the Court held that the bar under Section 125(3) cannot be applied

Passport Act, 1967; S. 10(3) (C ) –
Constitution of India; Art. 19 and 21 --
Facts of the Case : Maneka Gandhi was issued a passport on 1/06/1976 under the Passport Act 1967. The regional passport officer, New Delhi, issued a letter dated 2/7/1977 addressed to Maneka Gandhi, in which she was asked to surrender her passport under section 10(3)(c)of the Act in public interest, within 7 days from the date of receipt of the letter.

Maneka Gandhi immediately wrote a letter to the Regional Passport officer, New Delhi seeking in return a copy of the statement of reasons for such order. However, the government of India, Ministry of External Affairs refused to produce any such reason in the interest of general public. Later, a writ petition was filed by Maneka Gandhi under Article 32 of the Constitution in the Supreme Court challenging the order of the government of India as violating her fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:
1. Whether right to go abroad is a part of right to personal liberty under Article 21.
2. Whether the Passport Act prescribes a ‘procedure’ as required by Article 21 before depriving a person from the right guaranteed under the said article.
3. Whether section 10(3)(c) of the Passport Act is violative of Article 14,19(1) (a) and 21 of the constitution.
4. Whether the impugned order of the Regional passport officer is in contravention of the principle of natural justice.

Judgement and the Guidelines Issued:
>> To the extent to which section 10(3)(c) of the Passport Act, 1967 authorizes the passport authority to impound a passport “in the interest of the general public”, it violates Article 14 as it confers vague and undefined power on the passport authority.
>> Section 10(3)(c) is void as conferring an arbitrary power as it doesn’t provide for a hearing to the holder of the passport before the passport is impounded.
>> Section 10(3)(c) is violative of Article as does not prescribe ‘procedure’ within the meaning of that article and the procedure practiced is worst.
>> Section 10(3)(c) is against Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) since it permits restrictions to be imposed on the rights guaranteed by these articles even though such restrictions cannot be imposed under articles 19(2) and 19(6).
>> A new doctrine of post decisional theory was evolved.
>> One of the significant interpretation in this case is the discovery of inter connections between the three Articles- Article 14, 19 and 21.
>> This law which prescribes a procedure for depriving a person of “personal liberty” has to fulfill the requirements of Articles 14 and 19 also.
>> It was finally held by the court that the right to travel and go outside the country is included in the right to personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21.
>> The rule was an enabling law which must also be “just, fair and reasonable”.

Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996; S. 8 ----- Whether termination of agreement by one party on account of breach committed by the other can make the arbitration clause inoperative ----- Held: where an agreement is terminated by one party on account of the breach committed by the other, particularly, in a case where the clause is framed in wide and general terms, merely because agreement has come to an end by its termination by mutual consent, the arbitration clause does not get perished nor is rendered inoperative.
Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996; S. 8 ----- Whether termination of agreement by one party on account of breach committed by the other can make the arbitration clause inoperative ----- Held: the prerequisites for an application under Section 8 are fulfilled, viz., there is an arbitration agreement; the party to the agreement brings an action in the court against the other party; the subject matter of the action is the same as the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement; and the other party moves the court for referring the parties to arbitration before it submits his first statement on the substance of the dispute ----- the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit afteran application under Section 8 of the Act is made for arbitration.

Revenue Record – Whether Revenue Record establish title – Held: revenue record is not a document of title. It merely raises a presumption in regard to possession. Presumption of possession and/or continuity thereof, both forward and backward, can also be raised under Section 110 of the Evidence Act.

Possession follows title -- Held: Possession follows title is applicable in cases where proof of actual possession cannot reasonably be expected, for instance, in the case of waste lands, or where nothing is known about possession one-way or another. Presumption of title as a result of possession, can arise only where facts disclose that no title vests in any party.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; O. 6 R. 17 ----- Amendment of plaint after a final decree is passed in a suit for partition ----- application for amendment of a mistake, said to be a clerical one, in the decree, seeking deletion of the Town Survey No. 462 and substituting the same by the Town Survey No. 463 ---- The village became a part of the municipality, by reason whereof a new Town Survey was assigned to the suit land being Town Survey No. 463 ------ In the plaint and consequently in the preliminary decree as also in the final decree, Town Survey No. 462 was mistakenly mentioned, which was evidently a typographical mistake ----- The facts are not disputed. The identity of the suit land has not been changed ----- It is not a case where, as submitted by Mr. Mahabir Singh, one land is being substituted by another ----- The fact that the town survey No. 463 is a joint family property is not in dispute ----- As indicated hereinbefore, it is the same plot which was the subject matter of sale ----- Order of the High Court confirming the order of the Civil Court allowing the amendment is confirmed.

Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS) -- Claim for reimbursement – Whether claim can be rejected as the Superspeciality hospital is not included in the Government Order – Held: The right to medical claim cannot be denied merely because the name of the hospital is not included in the Government Order.

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (the Atrocities Act), S. 3(1)(ix), 3(2)(vi) and 3(2)(vii) read with 18 ------
Whether there is an absolute bar to the grant of anticipatory bail ----- unless exclusion of anticipatory bail is limited to genuine cases and inapplicable to cases where there is no prima facie case was made out, there will be no protection available to innocent citizens ----- Limiting the exclusion of anticipatory bail in such cases is essential for protection of fundamental right of life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution ----- exclusion of provision for anticipatory bail will not apply when no prima facie case is made out or the case is patently false or mala fide ----- protection of innocent against abuse of law is part of inherent jurisdiction of the Court being part of access to justice and protection of liberty against any oppressive action such as mala fide arrest

General Clauses Act, 1897; S. 27 -----  Evidence Act, 1872; S. 114 -----
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1882; S. 138 ----- Whether it is necessary to state that the notice issued under Section 138 of the NI Act by the complainant was served upon the respondent-accused on any specific date ----- Held: since the NI Act does not require that notice should only be given by ‘post’ in a case where the sender has despatched the notice by post with correct address written on it, Section 27 of the GC Act could be profitably imported and in such a situation service of notice is deemed to have been effected on the sender unless he proves that it was really not served and that he was not responsible for such non-service ----- Section 114 of the Evidence Act enables the Court to presume that in the common course of natural events, the communication would have been delivered at the address of the addressee.

Evidence Act, 1872; S. 165 – Right of Court to put question – Held: Court has a right to ask the party even relevant or irrelevant questions and the parties or their counsel cannot raise any objection to any such question.