LAW OFFICE ONLINE

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S. 154 – Registration of F.I.R. – The mandate upon the Police – Held: (i) Registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation. (ii) If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not. (iii) If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. In cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a copy of the entry of such closure must be supplied to the first informant forthwith and not later than one week. It must disclose reasons in brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding further. (iv) The police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering offence if cognizable offence is disclosed. Action must be taken against erring officers who do not register the FIR if information received by him discloses a cognizable offence. (v) The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the information received but only to ascertain whether the information reveals any cognizable offence. (vi) As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under: (a) Matrimonial disputes/ family disputes (b) Commercial offences (c) Medical negligence cases (d) Corruption cases (e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay. The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant preliminary inquiry. (vii) While ensuring and protecting the rights of the accused and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be made time bound and in any case it should not exceed 7 days. The fact of such delay and the causes of it must be reflected in the General Diary entry. (viii) Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary is the record of all information received in a police station, we direct that all information relating to cognizable offences, whether resulting in registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the said Diary and the decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be reflected, as mentioned above.

General Clauses Act, 1897; S. 27 -----  Evidence Act, 1872; S. 114 -----
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1882; S. 138 ----- Whether it is necessary to state that the notice issued under Section 138 of the NI Act by the complainant was served upon the respondent-accused on any specific date ----- Held: since the NI Act does not require that notice should only be given by ‘post’ in a case where the sender has despatched the notice by post with correct address written on it, Section 27 of the GC Act could be profitably imported and in such a situation service of notice is deemed to have been effected on the sender unless he proves that it was really not served and that he was not responsible for such non-service ----- Section 114 of the Evidence Act enables the Court to presume that in the common course of natural events, the communication would have been delivered at the address of the addressee.

Power of Attorney Act, 1882; S. 1A , 2 ------ Transfer of Property Act, 1882 : Validity and legality of SA/GPA/WILL transaction ----- A power of attorney is not an instrument of transfer in regard to any right, title or interest in an immovable property ----- The power of attorney is creation of an agency whereby the grantor authorizes the grantee to do the acts specified therein, on behalf of grantor, which when executed will be binding on the grantor as if done by him ----- An attorney holder may however execute a deed of conveyance in exercise of the power granted under the power of attorney and convey title on behalf of the grantor ----- SA/GPA/WILL transaction does not convey any title nor create any interest in an immovable property ----- the “concept of power of attorney sales have been recognized as a mode of transaction” when dealing with transactions by way of SA/GPA/WILL are unwarranted and not justified, unintendedly misleading the general public into thinking that SA/GPA/WILL transactions are some kind of a recognized or accepted mode of transfer and that it can be a valid substitute for a sale deed.
Such decisions to the extent they recognize or accept SA/GPA/WILL transactions as concluded transfers, as contrasted from an agreement to transfer, are not good law ----- Transactions of the nature of ‘GPA sales’ or ‘SA/GPA/WILL transfers’ do not convey title and do not amount to transfer, nor can they be recognized or valid mode of transfer of immoveable property ----- Held: We make it clear that our observations are not intended to in any way affect the validity of sale agreements and powers of attorney executed in genuine transactions. For example, a person may give a power of attorney to his spouse, son, daughter, brother, sister or a relative to manage his affairs or to execute a deed of conveyance. A person may enter into a development agreement with a land developer or builder for developing the land either by forming plots or by constructing apartment buildings and in that behalf execute an agreement of sale and grant a Power of Attorney empowering the
developer to execute agreements of sale or conveyances in regard to individual plots of land or undivided shares in the land relating to apartments in favour of prospective purchasers. In several States, the execution of such development agreements and powers of attorney are already regulated by law and subjected to specific stamp duty. Our observations regarding ‘SA/GPA/WILL transactions’ are not intended to apply to such bonafide/genuine transactions.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S. 205 ------ Exemption from personal appearance ----- Case under section 498A IPC read with S.4 of D.P. Act at Patna ----- Appellant No. 1 is a retired Army personal and residing in Pune, Appellant No. 2, Appellant No. 3 and 4 are also resident of Pune and the husband is working in Hyderabad ------- The appellants are engaged in their respective jobs at their respective places ------ Sufficient grounds are there to allow application under section 205 Cr.P.C.

Constitution of India; Art. 14 and 21 -- Recognition of third gender –

Held: the Court upheld transgender persons’ right to self-identify their gender. The Constitution requires equal treatment of all people regardless of their gender identity or expression. The Court declared that the Centre and State governments must grant legal recognition of gender identity as male, female or third gender. A full recognition is to be given even in the absence of any existing statutory regime. Additionally, the Court declared that educational, social and health care issues faced by transgender people must be addressed both at the centre and state government levels.

Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996; S. 8 ----- Whether termination of agreement by one party on account of breach committed by the other can make the arbitration clause inoperative ----- Held: where an agreement is terminated by one party on account of the breach committed by the other, particularly, in a case where the clause is framed in wide and general terms, merely because agreement has come to an end by its termination by mutual consent, the arbitration clause does not get perished nor is rendered inoperative.
Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996; S. 8 ----- Whether termination of agreement by one party on account of breach committed by the other can make the arbitration clause inoperative ----- Held: the prerequisites for an application under Section 8 are fulfilled, viz., there is an arbitration agreement; the party to the agreement brings an action in the court against the other party; the subject matter of the action is the same as the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement; and the other party moves the court for referring the parties to arbitration before it submits his first statement on the substance of the dispute ----- the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit afteran application under Section 8 of the Act is made for arbitration.

Code of Civil Procedure,1908 ; Order XIII, Rule 3 –
Indian Stamp Act, 1899 : Art. 45, Sec. 35 –
Indian Registration Act, 1908; Sec.17,49 –
Hindu Succession Act, 1955 –
Civil Procedure Code, 1908; Order VII Rule 11—Difference between Memorandum of family settlement and Family Settlement – the alleged memorandum of family settlement divided the entire property between plaintiff and defendant and there is relinquishment of the rights of other heirs of the properties and as such it is Family Settlement and not memo (Para 11) – memo does not create any right -- the document was compulsorily registrable under Section 17 of the Registration Act as there was relinquishment of share – it should be stamped in proper manner as specified in the Indian Stamp Act – document also being not stamped could not have been accepted in evidence (Para 13) -- whether the said document could have been accepted by the trial court in evidence or not -- whether the said unregistered and properly not stamped document which was inadmissible in evidence could have been used for any collateral purpose -- Held: the same are not admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving primary purpose of partition – unstampped instrument is not admissible in evidence even for collateral purpose, until the same is impounded by paying stamp with penalty.

Hindu Succession Act, 1956; -- Whether illegitimate son/daughter does not succeed his/her mother's property -- The normal rule of construction of the words "child" "son" or "daughter" in a statute would include only legitimate children. No doubt, there might be express provision in the statute itself to give these words a more extended meaning as to include also illegitimate children and s. 3(j) of the Hindu Succession Act (Act XXX of 1956) furnishes a good illustration of such a provision. It might even be that without an express provision in that regard the context might indicate That the words were used in a more comprehensive sense as indicating merely a blood relationship apart from the question of legitimacy. Section 15 contains no express provision and the context, so far as it goes, is not capable of lending any support to such a construction. In the first place, the words "Son or daughter" occur more than once in that section. It was fairly conceded on behalf of the appellant that where the son or daughter of a male vendor is referred to, as in s. 15 (1), the words mean only the legitimate issue of the vendor. If so, it cannot be that in the case of a female vendor the words could have a different connotation. Even taking the case of a female vendor herself, there is a reference in s. 15(2)(a)(i) to the brother’s son of such vendor. It could hardly be argued that a brother’s illegitimate son is comprehended within those words. Therefore, it must be held that when s. 15(2)(b)(i) uses the words "son or daughter" it meant only a legitimate son and legitimate daughter of the female vendor.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S. 256 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1882; S. 138—Whether dismissal of complaint due to non-appearance of the complainant amounts to acquittal of the accused under section 256 Cr.P.C. – Held: In the facts of the case, that dismissal of the complaint for non-appearance of the complainant amounts to acquittal as contemplated in Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S. 439 ----- Application for Bail to Session Court or High Court without filing application before the Magistrate ---
-- If maintainable ----- Held: that there are no restrictions on the High Court or Sessions Court to entertain an application for bail, provided, accused is in custody.