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Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S. 340 ----- What are necessary conditions for initiation of proceeding under section 340 Cr.P.C. ----- Held: The mere fact that a person has made a contradictory statement in a judicial proceeding is not by itself always sufficient to justify a prosecution under Sections 199 and 200 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) (hereinafter referred to as “the IPC”); but it must be shown that the defendant has intentionally given a false statement at any stage of the judicial proceedings or fabricated false evidence for the purpose of using the same at any stage of the judicial proceedings. Even after the above position has emerged also, still the court has to form an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to initiate an inquiry into the offences of false evidence and offences against public justice and more specifically referred in Section 340(1) of the CrPC, having regard to the overall factual matrix as well as the probable consequences of such a 6 Page 7 prosecution.

Limitation Act, 1963; S. 6 and 8; Limitation Act, 1963; Art. 60 -- The starting point of limitation is the attaining of majority by the ward and the period of limitation is three years -- the alienation was effected in 1953 and the period of 12 years should be calculated from that date. Section 6 of the Limitation Act provides that a person entitled to institute a suit is at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor, he may institute the suit within the same period after the disability has ceased, as would otherwise has been allowed from the time specified therefore in the third column of the schedule. Section 8 provides that nothing in Section 6 applies to suits to enforce rights of pre-emptions, or shall be deemed to extend for more than three years from the cessation of the disability, the period of limitation for any suit.

Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS) -- Claim for reimbursement – Whether claim can be rejected as the Superspeciality hospital is not included in the Government Order – Held: The right to medical claim cannot be denied merely because the name of the hospital is not included in the Government Order.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S. 205 ------ Exemption from personal appearance ----- Case under section 498A IPC read with S.4 of D.P. Act at Patna ----- Appellant No. 1 is a retired Army personal and residing in Pune, Appellant No. 2, Appellant No. 3 and 4 are also resident of Pune and the husband is working in Hyderabad ------- The appellants are engaged in their respective jobs at their respective places ------ Sufficient grounds are there to allow application under section 205 Cr.P.C.

Land Encroachment Act, 1905; S. 6, 7 – Evidence Act, 1872; S. 90, 110 – Presumption of title as a result of possession, can arise only where facts disclose that no title vests in any party -
- Possession of the plaintiff is not prima facie wrongful, and title of the plaintiff is not proved -- It certainly does not mean that because a man has title over some land, he is necessarily in possession of it -- if at any time a man with title was in possession of the said property, the law allows the presumption that such possession was in continuation of the title vested in him -- person must establish that he has continued possession of the suit property -- other side claiming title, must make out a case of trespass/ encroachment etc -- mere acceptance of municipal tax or agricultural tax by a person, cannot stop the State from challenging ownership of the land -- Nor can such a presumption arise in case of grant of loan by a bank upon it hypothecating the property -- revenue records confer title, for the reason that they merely show possession of a person -- Held: A revenue record is not a document of title -- It merely raises a presumption in regard to possession

Estoppel -- Estoppel in Criminal Proceedings -- The rule regarding issue estoppel relates to admissibility of evidence in subsequent proceedings which is designed to up-set a finding of fact recorded on the previous occasion and mandates that the finding so rendered on earlier occasion must operate as issue estoppel in subsequent proceedings -- It makes it impermissible to lead any such evidence at a subsequent stage or occasion -- Where an issue of fact has been tried by a competent court on an earlier occasion and a finding has been recorded in favour of the accused, such a finding would constitute an estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution, not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused for a different or distinct offence, but as precluding the acceptance/reception of evidence to disturb the finding of fact when the accused is tried subsequently for a different offence -- This rule is distinct from the doctrine of double jeopardy as it does not prevent the trial of any offence but only precludes the evidence being led to prove a fact in issue as regards which evidence has already been led and a specific finding has been recorded at an earlier criminal trial.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S. 256 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1882; S. 138—Whether dismissal of complaint due to non-appearance of the complainant amounts to acquittal of the accused under section 256 Cr.P.C. – Held: In the facts of the case, that dismissal of the complaint for non-appearance of the complainant amounts to acquittal as contemplated in Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Evidence Act, 1972 – Appreciation of Evidence – Behaviour of witnesses – Held: the reactions of these witnesses in running away from the site of occurrence appears to be a natural human reaction under the facts and circumstances of the case. Behaviour of the witnesses or their reactions would differ from situation to situation and individual to individual. Expecting uniformity in their reactions would be unrealistic, and no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the uniformity of the human reaction. The evidence of the three eyewitnesses cannot be faulted merely because they ran away;

Maxim -- Falsus In Uno, Falsus In Omnibus -- (false in one thing, false in everything) is not being used in India. Virtually, it is not applicable to the Indian scenario. Hence, the said maxim is treated as neither a sound rule of law nor a rule of practice in India. Hardly, one comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggerations, embroideries or embellishments. It is the duty of the Court to scrutinise the evidence carefully and, in terms of felicitous metaphor, separate the grain from the chaff. But, it cannot obviously disbelieve the substratum of the prosecution case or the material parts of the evidence and reconstruct a story of its own out of the rest. Efforts should be made to find the truth. This is the very object for which Courts are created. To search it out, the Court has to disperse the suspicious cloud and dust out the smear of dust, as all these things clog the very truth. So long as chaff, cloud and dust remain, the criminals are clothed with this protective layer to receive the benefit of doubt. So, it is a solemn duty of the Courts, not to merely conclude and leave the case the moment suspicions are created. It is the onerous duty of the Court, within permissible limits to find out the truth. It means, on one hand that no innocent man should be punished, but on the other hand to see no person committing an offence should go scot free. If in spite of such effort suspicion is not dissolved, it remains writ at large, benefit of doubt has to be credited to the accused. The evidence is to be considered from the point of view of trustworthiness and once the same stands satisfied, it ought to inspire confidence in the mind of the Court to accept the evidence.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S. 439 ----- Grant of Bail ----- The court granting bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course ---- Though at the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merit of the case need not be undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where the accused is charged of having committed a serious offence ----- Any order devoid of such reasons would suffer from non-application of mind ----- It is also necessary for the court granting bail to consider, among other circumstances, the following factors also before granting bail; they are: (a) The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence. (b) Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant. (c) Prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge.

Code of Civil Procedure,1908 ; Order XIII, Rule 3 –
Indian Stamp Act, 1899 : Art. 45, Sec. 35 –
Indian Registration Act, 1908; Sec.17,49 –
Hindu Succession Act, 1955 –
Civil Procedure Code, 1908; Order VII Rule 11—Difference between Memorandum of family settlement and Family Settlement – the alleged memorandum of family settlement divided the entire property between plaintiff and defendant and there is relinquishment of the rights of other heirs of the properties and as such it is Family Settlement and not memo (Para 11) – memo does not create any right -- the document was compulsorily registrable under Section 17 of the Registration Act as there was relinquishment of share – it should be stamped in proper manner as specified in the Indian Stamp Act – document also being not stamped could not have been accepted in evidence (Para 13) -- whether the said document could have been accepted by the trial court in evidence or not -- whether the said unregistered and properly not stamped document which was inadmissible in evidence could have been used for any collateral purpose -- Held: the same are not admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving primary purpose of partition – unstampped instrument is not admissible in evidence even for collateral purpose, until the same is impounded by paying stamp with penalty.