LAW OFFICE ONLINE

Limitation Act, 1963; S. 27— Limitation Act, 1963; Art. 65 and 66 -- Adverse Possession -- It is a settled principle of law of adverse possession that the person, who claims title over the property on the strength of adverse possession and thereby wants the Court to divest the true owner of his ownership rights over such property, is required to prove his case only against the true owner of the property -- It is equally well-settled that such person must necessarily first admit the ownership of the true owner over the property to the knowledge of the true owner and secondly, the true owner has to be made a party to the suit to enable the Court to decide the plea of adverse possession between the two rival claimants.

Hindu Succession Act, 1956; -- Whether illegitimate son/daughter does not succeed his/her mother's property -- The normal rule of construction of the words "child" "son" or "daughter" in a statute would include only legitimate children. No doubt, there might be express provision in the statute itself to give these words a more extended meaning as to include also illegitimate children and s. 3(j) of the Hindu Succession Act (Act XXX of 1956) furnishes a good illustration of such a provision. It might even be that without an express provision in that regard the context might indicate That the words were used in a more comprehensive sense as indicating merely a blood relationship apart from the question of legitimacy. Section 15 contains no express provision and the context, so far as it goes, is not capable of lending any support to such a construction. In the first place, the words "Son or daughter" occur more than once in that section. It was fairly conceded on behalf of the appellant that where the son or daughter of a male vendor is referred to, as in s. 15 (1), the words mean only the legitimate issue of the vendor. If so, it cannot be that in the case of a female vendor the words could have a different connotation. Even taking the case of a female vendor herself, there is a reference in s. 15(2)(a)(i) to the brother’s son of such vendor. It could hardly be argued that a brother’s illegitimate son is comprehended within those words. Therefore, it must be held that when s. 15(2)(b)(i) uses the words "son or daughter" it meant only a legitimate son and legitimate daughter of the female vendor.

Land Encroachment Act, 1905; S. 6, 7 – Evidence Act, 1872; S. 90, 110 – Presumption of title as a result of possession, can arise only where facts disclose that no title vests in any party -
- Possession of the plaintiff is not prima facie wrongful, and title of the plaintiff is not proved -- It certainly does not mean that because a man has title over some land, he is necessarily in possession of it -- if at any time a man with title was in possession of the said property, the law allows the presumption that such possession was in continuation of the title vested in him -- person must establish that he has continued possession of the suit property -- other side claiming title, must make out a case of trespass/ encroachment etc -- mere acceptance of municipal tax or agricultural tax by a person, cannot stop the State from challenging ownership of the land -- Nor can such a presumption arise in case of grant of loan by a bank upon it hypothecating the property -- revenue records confer title, for the reason that they merely show possession of a person -- Held: A revenue record is not a document of title -- It merely raises a presumption in regard to possession

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; O. 6 R. 17 ----- Whether a property can be added in the list of properties after a preliminary decree is passed in a partition suit is the question involved herein ----- Held: In certain situations, for the purpose of complete adjudication of the disputes between the parties an appellate Court may also take into consideration subsequent events after passing of the preliminary decree ----- The Trial Court felt that it had committed a mistake. In such a situation, the court, in our opinion, committed no infirmity in directing rectification of its mistake.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; S. 97 ----- Section 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for an appeal against preliminary decree but the said provision, in our opinion, would not be a bar to file an application for amendment of a decree.

Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Buyer’s Agreement dated 16.04.2010 was executed between them ------ The Builder was required to deliver possession of the flat to the Complainants within 36 months from the date of the Buyer’s Agreement ----- The grievance of the Complainants was that the Builder had failed to offer possession to them within the time period stipulated in the Buyer’s Agreement ------ Commission found that none of the reasons given by the Builder for the delay, such as non-availability of construction material or labour, were tenable ----- The Commission also rejected the argument of the Builder regarding government regulations and economic recession being a justification of the delay ----- The Buyer’s Agreement was entered into by Complainants with almost no bargaining power and under the threat of losing the earnest money ------ Further, under the Buyer’s Agreement, in case of delay in payment by the Complainant, an interest at a rate ranging from 18% to 24% per annum compounded annually was charged.

Consumer Protection Act, 1986; S. 2(1) (d) ----- Whether land owner who entered into agreement with Developer for development of property is a consumer ------ What is required to be scrutinised whether there is any joint venture agreement between the appellant and the respondent ----- The MOU that was entered into between the parties even remotely does not indicate that it is a joint venture ----- As per MOU the land owner has no say or control over the construction, he does not participate in the business, he is only entitled to a certain constructed area ----- The irresistible conclusion is that the appellant is a consumer under the Act.

Code of Civil Procedure,1908 ; Order XIII, Rule 3 –
Indian Stamp Act, 1899 : Art. 45, Sec. 35 –
Indian Registration Act, 1908; Sec.17,49 –
Hindu Succession Act, 1955 –
Civil Procedure Code, 1908; Order VII Rule 11—Difference between Memorandum of family settlement and Family Settlement – the alleged memorandum of family settlement divided the entire property between plaintiff and defendant and there is relinquishment of the rights of other heirs of the properties and as such it is Family Settlement and not memo (Para 11) – memo does not create any right -- the document was compulsorily registrable under Section 17 of the Registration Act as there was relinquishment of share – it should be stamped in proper manner as specified in the Indian Stamp Act – document also being not stamped could not have been accepted in evidence (Para 13) -- whether the said document could have been accepted by the trial court in evidence or not -- whether the said unregistered and properly not stamped document which was inadmissible in evidence could have been used for any collateral purpose -- Held: the same are not admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving primary purpose of partition – unstampped instrument is not admissible in evidence even for collateral purpose, until the same is impounded by paying stamp with penalty.

Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act, 1963 -----
Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulations of the Promotion of Construction etc) Rules. 1964 ------
Development Control Regulations for Greater Bombay, 1991 ------
Maharashtra Apartment Ownership Act, 1970 -------
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 -----
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 -----

(i) whether stand alone ‘garage’ or in other words ‘garage’ as an independent unit by itself is a ‘flat’ within the meaning of Section 2(a-1) of MOFA ----- stand alone ‘garage’ or in other words ‘garage’ as an independent unit by itself is not a ‘flat’ within the meaning of Section 2(a-1) and we answer question (i) in the negative.

(ii) whether stilt parking space/open parking space of a building regulated by MOFA is a ‘garage’ ----- A stilt area is a space above the ground and below the first floor having columns that support the first floor and the building ---- It may be usable as a parking space but we do not think that for the purposes of MOFA, such portion could be treated as garage.

(iii) If the answer to aforesaid questions is in the negative, whether stilt parking space/open parking space in such building is part of ‘common areas and facilities’ ------ Stilt parking spaces would not cease to be part of common areas and facilities merely because the promoter has not described the same as such in the advertisement and agreement with the flat purchaser; (iv) what are the rights of the promoter vis-à-vis society (of flat purchasers) in respect of open parking space/s / stilt parking space/s ------ The promoter has no right to sell any portion of such building which is not flat ------ Held: It is thus clear that the promoter has no right to sell “stilt parking spaces” as these are neither “flat” not appurtenant or attachment to a “flat”;