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Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; O. 6 R. 17 ----- Whether a property can be added in the list of properties after a preliminary decree is passed in a partition suit is the question involved herein ----- Held: In certain situations, for the purpose of complete adjudication of the disputes between the parties an appellate Court may also take into consideration subsequent events after passing of the preliminary decree ----- The Trial Court felt that it had committed a mistake. In such a situation, the court, in our opinion, committed no infirmity in directing rectification of its mistake.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; S. 97 ----- Section 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for an appeal against preliminary decree but the said provision, in our opinion, would not be a bar to file an application for amendment of a decree.

Civil Law – Practice and Procedure – Held: Cause of action to claim a relief of permanent injunction and the cause of action to claim a relief of specific performance of agreement are independent and one cannot include the other and vice versa -- a plaintiff cannot claim a relief of specific performance of agreement against the defendant on a cause of action on which he has claimed a relief of permanent injunction.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; O. 2 R. 2(2) -- Suit to include the whole claim -- the sine qua non for invoking Order 2 Rule 2(2) against the plaintiff by the defendant is that the relief which the plaintiff has claimed in the second suit was also available to the plaintiff for being claimed in the previous suit on the causes of action pleaded in the previous suit against the defendant and yet not claimed by the plaintiff.

Estoppel -- Estoppel in Criminal Proceedings -- The rule regarding issue estoppel relates to admissibility of evidence in subsequent proceedings which is designed to up-set a finding of fact recorded on the previous occasion and mandates that the finding so rendered on earlier occasion must operate as issue estoppel in subsequent proceedings -- It makes it impermissible to lead any such evidence at a subsequent stage or occasion -- Where an issue of fact has been tried by a competent court on an earlier occasion and a finding has been recorded in favour of the accused, such a finding would constitute an estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution, not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused for a different or distinct offence, but as precluding the acceptance/reception of evidence to disturb the finding of fact when the accused is tried subsequently for a different offence -- This rule is distinct from the doctrine of double jeopardy as it does not prevent the trial of any offence but only precludes the evidence being led to prove a fact in issue as regards which evidence has already been led and a specific finding has been recorded at an earlier criminal trial.

General Clauses Act, 1897; S. 27 -----  Evidence Act, 1872; S. 114 -----
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1882; S. 138 ----- Whether it is necessary to state that the notice issued under Section 138 of the NI Act by the complainant was served upon the respondent-accused on any specific date ----- Held: since the NI Act does not require that notice should only be given by ‘post’ in a case where the sender has despatched the notice by post with correct address written on it, Section 27 of the GC Act could be profitably imported and in such a situation service of notice is deemed to have been effected on the sender unless he proves that it was really not served and that he was not responsible for such non-service ----- Section 114 of the Evidence Act enables the Court to presume that in the common course of natural events, the communication would have been delivered at the address of the addressee.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S.156----Whether Magistrate can interfere into investigation ------ Held: Section 156(3) provides for a check by the Magistrate on the police performing its duties under Chapter XII Cr.P.C. In cases where the Magistrate finds that the police has not done its duty of investigating the case at all, or has not done it satisfactorily, he can issue a direction to the police to do the investigation properly, and can monitor the same. (Para 15)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S.156----Whether Magistrate can order for reopening of investigation ------ Held: the Magistrate can order re-opening of the investigation even after the police submits the final report; (Para 16)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S.156---- Whether Magistrate can interfere into investigation ------ Held: In our opinion Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include all such powers in a Magistrate which are necessary for ensuring a proper investigation, and it includes the power to order registration of an F.I.R. and of ordering a proper investigation if the Magistrate is satisfied that a proper investigation has not been done, or is not being done by the police. Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., though briefly worded, in our opinion, is very wide and it will include all such incidental powers as are necessary for ensuring a proper investigation. (Para 17)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S.156---- Whether Magistrate can interfere into investigation ------ Held: we are of the view that although Section 156(3) is very briefly worded, there is an implied power in the Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to order registration of a criminal offence and /or to direct the officer in charge of the concerned police station to hold a proper investigation and take all such necessary steps that may be necessary for ensuring a proper investigation including monitoring the same. Even though these powers have not been expressly mentioned in Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C., we are of the opinion that they are implied in the above provision.
(Para 24)

Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act, 1963 -----
Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulations of the Promotion of Construction etc) Rules. 1964 ------
Development Control Regulations for Greater Bombay, 1991 ------
Maharashtra Apartment Ownership Act, 1970 -------
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 -----
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 -----

(i) whether stand alone ‘garage’ or in other words ‘garage’ as an independent unit by itself is a ‘flat’ within the meaning of Section 2(a-1) of MOFA ----- stand alone ‘garage’ or in other words ‘garage’ as an independent unit by itself is not a ‘flat’ within the meaning of Section 2(a-1) and we answer question (i) in the negative.

(ii) whether stilt parking space/open parking space of a building regulated by MOFA is a ‘garage’ ----- A stilt area is a space above the ground and below the first floor having columns that support the first floor and the building ---- It may be usable as a parking space but we do not think that for the purposes of MOFA, such portion could be treated as garage.

(iii) If the answer to aforesaid questions is in the negative, whether stilt parking space/open parking space in such building is part of ‘common areas and facilities’ ------ Stilt parking spaces would not cease to be part of common areas and facilities merely because the promoter has not described the same as such in the advertisement and agreement with the flat purchaser; (iv) what are the rights of the promoter vis-à-vis society (of flat purchasers) in respect of open parking space/s / stilt parking space/s ------ The promoter has no right to sell any portion of such building which is not flat ------ Held: It is thus clear that the promoter has no right to sell “stilt parking spaces” as these are neither “flat” not appurtenant or attachment to a “flat”;

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; S.138 ---- Complainant and accused both are working in Government College ----- Both are governed by the Government Servants’ Conduct Rules which prescribes the mode of lending and borrowing ----- Nothing on record to show that the prescribed mode has been complied with ----- Disputes concerning the source of fund of the complainant ------ Non Disclosure of the amount to Income Tax authority though the complainant is a regular Assessee ----- Complainant did not produce Bank Statement ----- The trial court took into account the testimony of the wife of the complaint in another criminal case arising under Section 138 of the N.I. Act in which she has stated that the present appellant/accused had not taken any loan from her husband ----- Acquittal of accused confirmed.

Consumer Protection Act, 1986; S. 2(1) (d) ----- Whether land owner who entered into agreement with Developer for development of property is a consumer ------ What is required to be scrutinised whether there is any joint venture agreement between the appellant and the respondent ----- The MOU that was entered into between the parties even remotely does not indicate that it is a joint venture ----- As per MOU the land owner has no say or control over the construction, he does not participate in the business, he is only entitled to a certain constructed area ----- The irresistible conclusion is that the appellant is a consumer under the Act.

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; S. 166 -- As to whether the owner has taken reasonable care to find out as to whether the driving licence produced by the driver (a fake one or otherwise), does not fulfil the requirements of law or not will have to be determined in each case.

Evidence Act, 1872; S. 65B (2) – Electronic record -- Specified conditions --
(i) The electronic record containing the information should have been produced by the computer during the period over which the same was regularly used to
store or process information for the purpose of any activity regularly carried on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of that computer;
(ii) The information of the kind contained in electronic record or of the kind from which the information is derived was regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activity;
(iii) During the material part of the said period, the computer was operating properly and that even if it was not operating properly for some time, the break or breaks had not affected either the record or the accuracy of its contents; and (iv) The information contained in the record should be a reproduction or derivation from the information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activity.;

Evidence Act, 1872; S. 65B (4) – Electronic record -- Conditions to be fulfilled --
(a) There must be a certificate which identifies the electronic record containing the statement;
(b) The certificate must describe the manner in which the electronic record was produced;
(c) The certificate must furnish the particulars of the device involved in the production of that record;
(d) The certificate must deal with the applicable conditions mentioned under Section 65B(2) of the Evidence Act; and
(e) The certificate must be signed by a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device.

Evidence Act, 1872; S. 65B (4) – Electronic record – Certificate -- The person issuing certificate needed only to state in the certificate that the same is to the best of his knowledge and belief -- Such a certificate must accompany the electronic record like computer printout, Compact Disc (CD), Video Compact Disc (VCD), pen drive, etc., pertaining to which a statement is sought to be given in evidence, when the same is produced in evidence.

Evidence Act, 1872; S. 65B (4) – Electronic record -- If an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act, the same is admissible in evidence, without compliance of the conditions in Section 65B of the Evidence Act.