Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Buyer’s Agreement dated 16.04.2010 was executed between them ------ The Builder was required to deliver possession of the flat to the Complainants within 36 months from the date of the Buyer’s Agreement ----- The grievance of the Complainants was that the Builder had failed to offer possession to them within the time period stipulated in the Buyer’s Agreement ------ Commission found that none of the reasons given by the Builder for the delay, such as non-availability of construction material or labour, were tenable ----- The Commission also rejected the argument of the Builder regarding government regulations and economic recession being a justification of the delay ----- The Buyer’s Agreement was entered into by Complainants with almost no bargaining power and under the threat of losing the earnest money ------ Further, under the Buyer’s Agreement, in case of delay in payment by the Complainant, an interest at a rate ranging from 18% to 24% per annum compounded annually was charged.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S. 205 ------ Exemption from personal appearance ----- Case under section 498A IPC read with S.4 of D.P. Act at Patna ----- Appellant No. 1 is a retired Army personal and residing in Pune, Appellant No. 2, Appellant No. 3 and 4 are also resident of Pune and the husband is working in Hyderabad ------- The appellants are engaged in their respective jobs at their respective places ------ Sufficient grounds are there to allow application under section 205 Cr.P.C.

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (the Atrocities Act), S. 3(1)(ix), 3(2)(vi) and 3(2)(vii) read with 18 ------
Whether there is an absolute bar to the grant of anticipatory bail ----- unless exclusion of anticipatory bail is limited to genuine cases and inapplicable to cases where there is no prima facie case was made out, there will be no protection available to innocent citizens ----- Limiting the exclusion of anticipatory bail in such cases is essential for protection of fundamental right of life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution ----- exclusion of provision for anticipatory bail will not apply when no prima facie case is made out or the case is patently false or mala fide ----- protection of innocent against abuse of law is part of inherent jurisdiction of the Court being part of access to justice and protection of liberty against any oppressive action such as mala fide arrest

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S. 156 (3) ----- Further investigation --- -- Held: on receipt of the report, before taking cognizance of the offence alleged, may direct further investigation under sub-Section (3) of Section 156 Cr.P.C. and require the police to make further report and that such power can be exercised suo motu, contingent on its satisfaction of the necessity thereof to espouse the cause of justice. (Para 27)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S. 156(3) ---- Whether a judicial Magistrate, after taking cognizance of an offence, on the basis of a police report and after appearance of the accused in pursuance of the process issued, can order of its own, further investigation ----- Held: the Magistrate of his own, cannot order further investigation after the accused had entered appearance pursuant to a process issued to him subsequent to the taking of the cognizance by him. (Para 31)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S. 173(8) ----- Whether, after the chargesheet had been filed by the investigating agency under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C, and charge had been framed against some of the accused persons on the basis thereof, and other co-accused had been discharged, the Magistrate could direct the investigating agency to conduct a re-investigation or further investigation under sub-Section (8) of Section 173 ----- Held: after taking cognizance of an offence on the basis of a police report and after the appearance of the accused, a Magistrate cannot of its own order further investigation, though such an order could be passed on the application of the investigating authority ----- the power of the investigating officer to make a prayer for conducting further investigation in terms of Section 173(8) of the Code was not taken away only because a charge-sheet had been filed under Section 173(2) and a further investigation was permissible even if cognizance had been taken by the Magistrate ----- once a charge-sheet was filed under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C and either charges have been framed or the accused have been discharged, the Magistrate may on the basis of a protest petition, take cognizance of the offence complained of or on the application made by the investigating authority, permit further investigation under Section 173(8), but he cannot suo motu direct a further investigation or order a re-investigation into a case on account of the bar of Section 167(2) of the Code. (Para 32, 33)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S. 173(8) ----- Whether in exercise of powers under Section 173 Cr.P.C, the Trial Court has the jurisdiction to ignore any of the police reports, where there was more than one, whether by the same or different investigating agencies submitted in furtherance of the orders of a Court ----- Held: the investigating agency was thus competent to file a report supplementary to its primary report and that the former was to be treated by the Court in continuation of the latter. (Para 36)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S. 173 ----- Whether Magistrate can direct further investigation either suo moto or on the prayer of the informant after the final report had been submitted, cognizance had been taken, accused had appeared, and trial is underway ----- Held: that though the investigating agency concerned has been invested with the power to undertake further investigation desirably after informing the Court thereof, before which it had submitted its report and obtaining its approval, no such power is available therefor to the learned Magistrate after cognizance has been taken on the basis of the earlier report, process has been issued and accused has entered appearance in response thereto. At that stage, neither the learned Magistrate suo motu nor on an application filed by the complainant/informant direct further investigation. Such a course would be open only on the request of the investigating agency and that too, in circumstances warranting further investigation on the detection of material evidence only to secure fair investigation and trial, the life purpose of the adjudication in hand ----- Though the Magistrate has the power to direct investigation under Section 156(3) at the pre-cognizance stage even after a charge-sheet or a closure report is submitted, once cognizance is taken and the accused person appears pursuant thereto, he would be bereft of any competence to direct further investigation either suo motu or acting on the request or prayer of the complainant/informant.

Words and Phrases ----- Investigation, Further Investigation and De novo Investigation ----- Held: Whereas initial investigation was alluded to be one conducted in furtherance of registration of an FIR leading to a final report under Section 173(2) of the Code, further investigation was a phenomenon where the investigating officer would obtain further oral or documentary evidence after the final report had already been submitted, so much so that the report on the basis of the subsequent disclosures/discoveries by way of such evidence would be in consolidation and in continuation of the previous investigation and the report yielded thereby. “Fresh investigation” “reinvestigation” “de novo investigation”, however is an exercise, which it was held, could neither be undertaken by the investigating agency suo motu nor could be ordered by the Magistrate and that it was essentially within the domain of the higher judiciary to direct the same and that too under limited compelling circumstances warranting such probe to ensure a just and fair investigation and trial. (Para 39)

Code of Criminal Procedure, S. 125, 126; ------- Territorial Jurisdiction to file case for maintenance ------- Regarding the place of institution and adjudication of the maintenance proceeding, it is indicated therein that such proceeding can be taken against any person in any district, inter alia, where the wife resides ---
-- The word ‘reside’ means to live or to have a dwelling place or an abode and is not equivalent to something in the nature of having a domicile in a particular
place or having a place as the place of origin or the place where the family used to live ----- The words ‘where he or his wife resides’ in section 126(1)(b) of the
Code has been interpreted to mean not only domicile in the technical sense of that word but also something more than a flying visit to or a casual stay in a particular place contemplating animus manendi or an intention to stay for a period. The length of the period is dependent upon the circumstances of each case ------ Thus a person ‘resides’ in a place if he/she through choice makes it his/her abode permanently or temporarily and whether he/she has chosen to make a particular place his/her abode or not depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case ----- The territorial jurisdiction is to be determined on the date of filing the application. Even if the wife resides at a place temporarily on the date of filing of the application under section 125 Cr.P.C., the concerned Court within whose territorial jurisdiction she is residing, can entertain such application. (Para 7);

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; S. 138/147 ----- Compounding of offence punishable under section 138 N. I. Act ----- The Accused offered cheque amount along with interest in accordance with the judgment of Damodar S. Prabhu vs Sayed Babalal H. (LU Mar 15) 2018 has not been accepted by the complainant on the pretext that the complainant is entitled to more amount beyond the amount of cheque for having been unnecessarily harassed ----- Held: the proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act cannot be permitted to be used as a trump card to earn interest in the garb of prosecution -----bonafide of an accused, who offer the amount of cheque in dispute in proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act cannot be ignored ----- Direction that the personal appearance of the accused may be exempted if the cheque amount along with interest is paid in accordance with the Damodar S. Prabhu vs Sayed Babalal H. (LU Mar 15) 2018 ------ evidence can be recorded in the presence of counsel for the petitioner by exempting his personal appearance.

Supreme Court observed: where the Court dealing with a matter is satisfied that a case is made out to waive the statutory period under Section 13B(2), it can do so after considering the following : i) the statutory period of six months specified in Section 13B(2), in addition to the statutory period of one year under Section 13B(1) of separation of parties is already over before the first motion itself; ii) all efforts for mediation/conciliation including efforts in terms of Order XXXIIA Rule 3 CPC/Section 23(2) of the Act/Section 9 of the Family Courts Act to reunite the parties have failed and there is no likelihood of success in that direction by any further efforts; iii) the parties have genuinely settled their differences including alimony, custody of child or any other pending issues between the parties; iv) the waiting period will only prolong their agony. Amardeep Singh vs Harveen Kaur

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence, 2005; Ss. 18, 19, 20 ------ Relief when the complainant/wife failed to prove Domestic Violence -------- Held: since the learned Magistrate has come to a conclusion that the domestic violence could not be proved and since that finding of the learned Magistrate has not been challenged by the aggrieved person, it follows that no relief could have been given to respondent Nos. 2 and 3 also

Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Insurance Company repudiated the insurance claim of the appellant citing breach of Condition No. 1, i.e. immediate information about the loss/theft of the vehicle ------ Held: If the reason for delay in making a claim is satisfactorily explained, such a claim cannot be rejected on the ground of delay ----- it would not be fair and reasonable to reject genuine claims which had already been verified and found to be correct by the Investigator ----- The condition regarding the delay shall not be a shelter to repudiate the insurance claims which have been otherwise proved to be genuine ----- It needs no emphasis that the Consumer Protection Act aims at providing better protection of the interest of consumers. It is a beneficial legislation that deserves liberal construction ----- It is common knowledge that a person who lost his vehicle may not straightaway go to the Insurance Company to claim compensation. At first, he will make efforts to trace the vehicle ----- Claim petition is allowed.

Agreement ----- Whether conditions printed at back of rent receipt constitute agreement between landlord and tenant?

Held: it cannot be said on the basis of what is printed on the back side of the rent receipt that the parties had accepted it as a condition of the lease. The rent receipt is a document issued by the landlord acknowledging receipt of payment of rent by him. Conditions printed at the back of rent receipt cannot be said to be a conscious decision taken by the parties governing the lease of premises. Terms and conditions of a lease result from conscious decision of parties.