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Limitation Act, 1963; S. 27— Limitation Act, 1963; Art. 65 and 66 -- Adverse Possession -- It is a settled principle of law of adverse possession that the person, who claims title over the property on the strength of adverse possession and thereby wants the Court to divest the true owner of his ownership rights over such property, is required to prove his case only against the true owner of the property -- It is equally well-settled that such person must necessarily first admit the ownership of the true owner over the property to the knowledge of the true owner and secondly, the true owner has to be made a party to the suit to enable the Court to decide the plea of adverse possession between the two rival claimants.

Anti Suit Injunction -- An anti-suit injunction is a judicial order restraining one party from prosecuting a case in another court outside its jurisdiction. The principles governing grant of injunction are common to that of granting anti-suit injunction. The cases of injunction are basically governed by the doctrine of equity. It is a well-settled law that the courts in India have power to issue anti-suit injunction to a party over whom it has personal jurisdiction, in an appropriate case.

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; S. 13 -- It is a well-settled law that the courts in India have power to issue anti-suit injunction to a party over whom it has personal jurisdiction, in an appropriate case.

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (the Atrocities Act), S. 3(1)(ix), 3(2)(vi) and 3(2)(vii) read with 18 ------
Whether there is an absolute bar to the grant of anticipatory bail ----- unless exclusion of anticipatory bail is limited to genuine cases and inapplicable to cases where there is no prima facie case was made out, there will be no protection available to innocent citizens ----- Limiting the exclusion of anticipatory bail in such cases is essential for protection of fundamental right of life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution ----- exclusion of provision for anticipatory bail will not apply when no prima facie case is made out or the case is patently false or mala fide ----- protection of innocent against abuse of law is part of inherent jurisdiction of the Court being part of access to justice and protection of liberty against any oppressive action such as mala fide arrest

Power of Attorney Act, 1882; S. 1A , 2 ------ Transfer of Property Act, 1882 : Validity and legality of SA/GPA/WILL transaction ----- A power of attorney is not an instrument of transfer in regard to any right, title or interest in an immovable property ----- The power of attorney is creation of an agency whereby the grantor authorizes the grantee to do the acts specified therein, on behalf of grantor, which when executed will be binding on the grantor as if done by him ----- An attorney holder may however execute a deed of conveyance in exercise of the power granted under the power of attorney and convey title on behalf of the grantor ----- SA/GPA/WILL transaction does not convey any title nor create any interest in an immovable property ----- the “concept of power of attorney sales have been recognized as a mode of transaction” when dealing with transactions by way of SA/GPA/WILL are unwarranted and not justified, unintendedly misleading the general public into thinking that SA/GPA/WILL transactions are some kind of a recognized or accepted mode of transfer and that it can be a valid substitute for a sale deed.
Such decisions to the extent they recognize or accept SA/GPA/WILL transactions as concluded transfers, as contrasted from an agreement to transfer, are not good law ----- Transactions of the nature of ‘GPA sales’ or ‘SA/GPA/WILL transfers’ do not convey title and do not amount to transfer, nor can they be recognized or valid mode of transfer of immoveable property ----- Held: We make it clear that our observations are not intended to in any way affect the validity of sale agreements and powers of attorney executed in genuine transactions. For example, a person may give a power of attorney to his spouse, son, daughter, brother, sister or a relative to manage his affairs or to execute a deed of conveyance. A person may enter into a development agreement with a land developer or builder for developing the land either by forming plots or by constructing apartment buildings and in that behalf execute an agreement of sale and grant a Power of Attorney empowering the
developer to execute agreements of sale or conveyances in regard to individual plots of land or undivided shares in the land relating to apartments in favour of prospective purchasers. In several States, the execution of such development agreements and powers of attorney are already regulated by law and subjected to specific stamp duty. Our observations regarding ‘SA/GPA/WILL transactions’ are not intended to apply to such bonafide/genuine transactions.

Hindu Succession Act, 1956; -- Whether illegitimate son/daughter does not succeed his/her mother's property -- The normal rule of construction of the words "child" "son" or "daughter" in a statute would include only legitimate children. No doubt, there might be express provision in the statute itself to give these words a more extended meaning as to include also illegitimate children and s. 3(j) of the Hindu Succession Act (Act XXX of 1956) furnishes a good illustration of such a provision. It might even be that without an express provision in that regard the context might indicate That the words were used in a more comprehensive sense as indicating merely a blood relationship apart from the question of legitimacy. Section 15 contains no express provision and the context, so far as it goes, is not capable of lending any support to such a construction. In the first place, the words "Son or daughter" occur more than once in that section. It was fairly conceded on behalf of the appellant that where the son or daughter of a male vendor is referred to, as in s. 15 (1), the words mean only the legitimate issue of the vendor. If so, it cannot be that in the case of a female vendor the words could have a different connotation. Even taking the case of a female vendor herself, there is a reference in s. 15(2)(a)(i) to the brother’s son of such vendor. It could hardly be argued that a brother’s illegitimate son is comprehended within those words. Therefore, it must be held that when s. 15(2)(b)(i) uses the words "son or daughter" it meant only a legitimate son and legitimate daughter of the female vendor.

Indian Succession Act, 1925; Ss. 281, 282 -- Whether execution of will in English can be doubted on ground that testator was not knowing English language ----- Held: The lack of knowledge of English even if can be attributed to the testator would not fundamentally alter the 14 Page 15 situation inasmuch as before registration of the Will the contents thereof can be understood to have been explained to the testator or ascertained from her by the Sub Registrar, who had deposed that such a practice is normally adhered to.

Indian Succession Act, 1925; -- Loss of original Will ----- Held: The stand of the plaintiff that the original Will was lost while in the custody of her mother and her knowledge of such loss on the day of her mother’s death cannot be disbelieved merely because no report in this regard was lodged before the police.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S. 439 ----- Grant of Bail ----- The court granting bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course ---- Though at the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merit of the case need not be undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where the accused is charged of having committed a serious offence ----- Any order devoid of such reasons would suffer from non-application of mind ----- It is also necessary for the court granting bail to consider, among other circumstances, the following factors also before granting bail; they are: (a) The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence. (b) Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant. (c) Prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge.

Evidence Act, 1872; ----- Whether Whatsapp forward can be treated as document as per Evidence Act ----- Held: Annexure - A does not even qualify as a document in terms of the Evidence Act, 1872, in as much as, neither the original nor the copy of the original has been produced. It is an admitted position that the petitioners have not seen original and have had no occasion to even compare Annexure - A with the original.

Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Rejection of Insurance claim – Insurance by home loan borrower – On 29.09.2008 premium was deducted from loan account towards Insurance company -- Proposal form dated 29.09.2008 was accompanied by good health declaration by the insured – Insured person died on 17.12.2009 – Neither the bank nor the insurance company had ever informed the proposer or the appellant herein about the non-issuance of policy for want of medical certificate -- in the case of joint housing loan the full loan amount will be insured even if the policy is issued in the name of only one loanee -- Claim to pay the outstanding loan amount rejected – State Commission allowed the claim – National Commission set aside the order of State Commission – Supreme Court upheld the observation of State Commission.

Passport Act, 1967; S. 10(3) (C ) –
Constitution of India; Art. 19 and 21 --
Facts of the Case : Maneka Gandhi was issued a passport on 1/06/1976 under the Passport Act 1967. The regional passport officer, New Delhi, issued a letter dated 2/7/1977 addressed to Maneka Gandhi, in which she was asked to surrender her passport under section 10(3)(c)of the Act in public interest, within 7 days from the date of receipt of the letter.

Maneka Gandhi immediately wrote a letter to the Regional Passport officer, New Delhi seeking in return a copy of the statement of reasons for such order. However, the government of India, Ministry of External Affairs refused to produce any such reason in the interest of general public. Later, a writ petition was filed by Maneka Gandhi under Article 32 of the Constitution in the Supreme Court challenging the order of the government of India as violating her fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:
1. Whether right to go abroad is a part of right to personal liberty under Article 21.
2. Whether the Passport Act prescribes a ‘procedure’ as required by Article 21 before depriving a person from the right guaranteed under the said article.
3. Whether section 10(3)(c) of the Passport Act is violative of Article 14,19(1) (a) and 21 of the constitution.
4. Whether the impugned order of the Regional passport officer is in contravention of the principle of natural justice.

Judgement and the Guidelines Issued:
>> To the extent to which section 10(3)(c) of the Passport Act, 1967 authorizes the passport authority to impound a passport “in the interest of the general public”, it violates Article 14 as it confers vague and undefined power on the passport authority.
>> Section 10(3)(c) is void as conferring an arbitrary power as it doesn’t provide for a hearing to the holder of the passport before the passport is impounded.
>> Section 10(3)(c) is violative of Article as does not prescribe ‘procedure’ within the meaning of that article and the procedure practiced is worst.
>> Section 10(3)(c) is against Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) since it permits restrictions to be imposed on the rights guaranteed by these articles even though such restrictions cannot be imposed under articles 19(2) and 19(6).
>> A new doctrine of post decisional theory was evolved.
>> One of the significant interpretation in this case is the discovery of inter connections between the three Articles- Article 14, 19 and 21.
>> This law which prescribes a procedure for depriving a person of “personal liberty” has to fulfill the requirements of Articles 14 and 19 also.
>> It was finally held by the court that the right to travel and go outside the country is included in the right to personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21.
>> The rule was an enabling law which must also be “just, fair and reasonable”.