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Anti Suit Injunction -- An anti-suit injunction is a judicial order restraining one party from prosecuting a case in another court outside its jurisdiction. The principles governing grant of injunction are common to that of granting anti-suit injunction. The cases of injunction are basically governed by the doctrine of equity. It is a well-settled law that the courts in India have power to issue anti-suit injunction to a party over whom it has personal jurisdiction, in an appropriate case.

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; S. 13 -- It is a well-settled law that the courts in India have power to issue anti-suit injunction to a party over whom it has personal jurisdiction, in an appropriate case.

Estoppel -- Estoppel in Criminal Proceedings -- The rule regarding issue estoppel relates to admissibility of evidence in subsequent proceedings which is designed to up-set a finding of fact recorded on the previous occasion and mandates that the finding so rendered on earlier occasion must operate as issue estoppel in subsequent proceedings -- It makes it impermissible to lead any such evidence at a subsequent stage or occasion -- Where an issue of fact has been tried by a competent court on an earlier occasion and a finding has been recorded in favour of the accused, such a finding would constitute an estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution, not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused for a different or distinct offence, but as precluding the acceptance/reception of evidence to disturb the finding of fact when the accused is tried subsequently for a different offence -- This rule is distinct from the doctrine of double jeopardy as it does not prevent the trial of any offence but only precludes the evidence being led to prove a fact in issue as regards which evidence has already been led and a specific finding has been recorded at an earlier criminal trial.

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; S.138 ---- Complainant and accused both are working in Government College ----- Both are governed by the Government Servants’ Conduct Rules which prescribes the mode of lending and borrowing ----- Nothing on record to show that the prescribed mode has been complied with ----- Disputes concerning the source of fund of the complainant ------ Non Disclosure of the amount to Income Tax authority though the complainant is a regular Assessee ----- Complainant did not produce Bank Statement ----- The trial court took into account the testimony of the wife of the complaint in another criminal case arising under Section 138 of the N.I. Act in which she has stated that the present appellant/accused had not taken any loan from her husband ----- Acquittal of accused confirmed.

Supreme Court observed: where the Court dealing with a matter is satisfied that a case is made out to waive the statutory period under Section 13B(2), it can do so after considering the following : i) the statutory period of six months specified in Section 13B(2), in addition to the statutory period of one year under Section 13B(1) of separation of parties is already over before the first motion itself; ii) all efforts for mediation/conciliation including efforts in terms of Order XXXIIA Rule 3 CPC/Section 23(2) of the Act/Section 9 of the Family Courts Act to reunite the parties have failed and there is no likelihood of success in that direction by any further efforts; iii) the parties have genuinely settled their differences including alimony, custody of child or any other pending issues between the parties; iv) the waiting period will only prolong their agony. Amardeep Singh vs Harveen Kaur

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S.156----Whether Magistrate can interfere into investigation ------ Held: Section 156(3) provides for a check by the Magistrate on the police performing its duties under Chapter XII Cr.P.C. In cases where the Magistrate finds that the police has not done its duty of investigating the case at all, or has not done it satisfactorily, he can issue a direction to the police to do the investigation properly, and can monitor the same. (Para 15)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S.156----Whether Magistrate can order for reopening of investigation ------ Held: the Magistrate can order re-opening of the investigation even after the police submits the final report; (Para 16)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S.156---- Whether Magistrate can interfere into investigation ------ Held: In our opinion Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include all such powers in a Magistrate which are necessary for ensuring a proper investigation, and it includes the power to order registration of an F.I.R. and of ordering a proper investigation if the Magistrate is satisfied that a proper investigation has not been done, or is not being done by the police. Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., though briefly worded, in our opinion, is very wide and it will include all such incidental powers as are necessary for ensuring a proper investigation. (Para 17)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S.156---- Whether Magistrate can interfere into investigation ------ Held: we are of the view that although Section 156(3) is very briefly worded, there is an implied power in the Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to order registration of a criminal offence and /or to direct the officer in charge of the concerned police station to hold a proper investigation and take all such necessary steps that may be necessary for ensuring a proper investigation including monitoring the same. Even though these powers have not been expressly mentioned in Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C., we are of the opinion that they are implied in the above provision.
(Para 24)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S. 125 – Whether qualified unemployed wife is entitled to get maintenance – Held: well qualified spouses desirous of remaining idle, not making efforts for the purpose of finding out a source of livelihood, have to be discouraged, if the society wants to progress -- Putting extra financial burden on the husband are to be discouraged.

Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act, 1963 -----
Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulations of the Promotion of Construction etc) Rules. 1964 ------
Development Control Regulations for Greater Bombay, 1991 ------
Maharashtra Apartment Ownership Act, 1970 -------
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 -----
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 -----

(i) whether stand alone ‘garage’ or in other words ‘garage’ as an independent unit by itself is a ‘flat’ within the meaning of Section 2(a-1) of MOFA ----- stand alone ‘garage’ or in other words ‘garage’ as an independent unit by itself is not a ‘flat’ within the meaning of Section 2(a-1) and we answer question (i) in the negative.

(ii) whether stilt parking space/open parking space of a building regulated by MOFA is a ‘garage’ ----- A stilt area is a space above the ground and below the first floor having columns that support the first floor and the building ---- It may be usable as a parking space but we do not think that for the purposes of MOFA, such portion could be treated as garage.

(iii) If the answer to aforesaid questions is in the negative, whether stilt parking space/open parking space in such building is part of ‘common areas and facilities’ ------ Stilt parking spaces would not cease to be part of common areas and facilities merely because the promoter has not described the same as such in the advertisement and agreement with the flat purchaser; (iv) what are the rights of the promoter vis-à-vis society (of flat purchasers) in respect of open parking space/s / stilt parking space/s ------ The promoter has no right to sell any portion of such building which is not flat ------ Held: It is thus clear that the promoter has no right to sell “stilt parking spaces” as these are neither “flat” not appurtenant or attachment to a “flat”;

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; S. 13 – Validity of Divorce Decree passed by Foreign Court – Held: The present decree dissolving the marriage passed by the foreign court is without jurisdiction according to the Act as neither the marriage was celebrated nor the parties last resided together nor the respondent resided within the jurisdiction of that Court -- The decree is also passed on a ground which is not available under the Act which is applicable to the marriage -- the decree has been obtained by the 1st appellant by stating that he was the resident of the Missouri State when the record shows that he was only a bird of passage there and was ordinarily a resident of the State of Louisiana – Such divorce decree cannot be taken into consideration.

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; S. 13 – Validity of Divorce Decree passed by Foreign Court – Rules framed are The jurisdiction assumed by the foreign court as well as the grounds on which the relief is granted must be in accordance with the matrimonial law under which the parties are married. The exceptions to this rule may be as follows: (i) where the matrimonial action is filed in the forum where the respondent is domiciled or habitually and permanently resides and the relief is granted on a ground available in the matrimonial law under which the parties are married; (ii) where the respondent voluntarily and effectively submits to the jurisdiction of the forum as discussed above and contests the claim which is based on a ground available under the matrimonial law under which the parties are married; (iii) where the respondent consents to the grant of the relief although the jurisdiction of the forum is not in accordance with the provisions of the matrimonial law of the parties.

Evidence Act, 1872; ----- Whether Whatsapp forward can be treated as document as per Evidence Act ----- Held: Annexure - A does not even qualify as a document in terms of the Evidence Act, 1872, in as much as, neither the original nor the copy of the original has been produced. It is an admitted position that the petitioners have not seen original and have had no occasion to even compare Annexure - A with the original.

Consumer Protection Act, 1986; After purchase an overseas travel insurance policy the Petitioner was underwent Coronary Bypass Graft Surgery and thereby spent 12,005 pounds -- Respondent repudiated the reimbursement and taken plea that the complainant have past medical history of hypercholestremia, Ischaemic Heart Disease as well as hypertension, which were excluded as per the insurance contract -- District Forum directed the Company to pay an amount of Rs.7,19,500/- for medical score with interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of complaint till the date of payment and also to pay Rs.2200/as litigation expenses.” -- State Commission allowed the same on appeal on the ground that complainant had obtained insurance policy by concealing the factum of his previous ailment, namely, hypertension, which has a nexus with the heart problem -- Revision allowed by NCDRC in favour of Claimant with observation that plea of concealment of material fact was not taken by the opposite party in the repudiation letter -- no evidence shown that the petitioner despite of having knowledge of his ailment concealed this fact in proposal form -- having history of hypertension does not lead to conclusion that petitioner was also having previous history of heart problem – heart problem cannot be termed as a claim in respect of a pre existing disease.