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Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S.156----Whether Magistrate can interfere into investigation ------ Held: Section 156(3) provides for a check by the Magistrate on the police performing its duties under Chapter XII Cr.P.C. In cases where the Magistrate finds that the police has not done its duty of investigating the case at all, or has not done it satisfactorily, he can issue a direction to the police to do the investigation properly, and can monitor the same. (Para 15)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S.156----Whether Magistrate can order for reopening of investigation ------ Held: the Magistrate can order re-opening of the investigation even after the police submits the final report; (Para 16)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S.156---- Whether Magistrate can interfere into investigation ------ Held: In our opinion Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include all such powers in a Magistrate which are necessary for ensuring a proper investigation, and it includes the power to order registration of an F.I.R. and of ordering a proper investigation if the Magistrate is satisfied that a proper investigation has not been done, or is not being done by the police. Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., though briefly worded, in our opinion, is very wide and it will include all such incidental powers as are necessary for ensuring a proper investigation. (Para 17)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S.156---- Whether Magistrate can interfere into investigation ------ Held: we are of the view that although Section 156(3) is very briefly worded, there is an implied power in the Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to order registration of a criminal offence and /or to direct the officer in charge of the concerned police station to hold a proper investigation and take all such necessary steps that may be necessary for ensuring a proper investigation including monitoring the same. Even though these powers have not been expressly mentioned in Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C., we are of the opinion that they are implied in the above provision.
(Para 24)

General Clauses Act, 1897; S. 27 -----  Evidence Act, 1872; S. 114 -----
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1882; S. 138 ----- Whether it is necessary to state that the notice issued under Section 138 of the NI Act by the complainant was served upon the respondent-accused on any specific date ----- Held: since the NI Act does not require that notice should only be given by ‘post’ in a case where the sender has despatched the notice by post with correct address written on it, Section 27 of the GC Act could be profitably imported and in such a situation service of notice is deemed to have been effected on the sender unless he proves that it was really not served and that he was not responsible for such non-service ----- Section 114 of the Evidence Act enables the Court to presume that in the common course of natural events, the communication would have been delivered at the address of the addressee.

Consumer Protection Act, 1986-Ss. 11 (1), 21 (a) (i), 17 (1) (a) (i) and 24A –

Allotment-Complainants applied for-Payments in installments-Terms and conditions of allotment-It is the case of complainants that respective date of possession have long expired but opposite party has failed to complete construction and deliver possession of respective apartments to complainant-Pecuniary jurisdiction-Interest claimed by apartment buyer is in nature of compensation-Held case should be dealt with under Clause 4 (e) of subject Builder Buyer Agreement, which provides that if opposite party is not in a position to offer possession of apartment to allottee, opposite party shall refund consideration amount received with 10% p.a.-Opposite party is liable to refund money received from the complainants with 10% p.a. on amount w.e.f. dates of respective payments of installments-Directions issued-Complaint allowed.

Limitation to file claim for due maintenance – Considering the peculiar circumstances of the case the Court held that the bar under Section 125(3) cannot be applied

Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Buyer’s Agreement dated 16.04.2010 was executed between them ------ The Builder was required to deliver possession of the flat to the Complainants within 36 months from the date of the Buyer’s Agreement ----- The grievance of the Complainants was that the Builder had failed to offer possession to them within the time period stipulated in the Buyer’s Agreement ------ Commission found that none of the reasons given by the Builder for the delay, such as non-availability of construction material or labour, were tenable ----- The Commission also rejected the argument of the Builder regarding government regulations and economic recession being a justification of the delay ----- The Buyer’s Agreement was entered into by Complainants with almost no bargaining power and under the threat of losing the earnest money ------ Further, under the Buyer’s Agreement, in case of delay in payment by the Complainant, an interest at a rate ranging from 18% to 24% per annum compounded annually was charged.

Anti Suit Injunction -- An anti-suit injunction is a judicial order restraining one party from prosecuting a case in another court outside its jurisdiction. The principles governing grant of injunction are common to that of granting anti-suit injunction. The cases of injunction are basically governed by the doctrine of equity. It is a well-settled law that the courts in India have power to issue anti-suit injunction to a party over whom it has personal jurisdiction, in an appropriate case.

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; S. 13 -- It is a well-settled law that the courts in India have power to issue anti-suit injunction to a party over whom it has personal jurisdiction, in an appropriate case.

Supreme Court observed: where the Court dealing with a matter is satisfied that a case is made out to waive the statutory period under Section 13B(2), it can do so after considering the following : i) the statutory period of six months specified in Section 13B(2), in addition to the statutory period of one year under Section 13B(1) of separation of parties is already over before the first motion itself; ii) all efforts for mediation/conciliation including efforts in terms of Order XXXIIA Rule 3 CPC/Section 23(2) of the Act/Section 9 of the Family Courts Act to reunite the parties have failed and there is no likelihood of success in that direction by any further efforts; iii) the parties have genuinely settled their differences including alimony, custody of child or any other pending issues between the parties; iv) the waiting period will only prolong their agony. Amardeep Singh vs Harveen Kaur

Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Force Majeure -- Complaint against developer for delayed possession – Developer took the plea of Force Majeure on the ground that Authority failed to supply electricity in time – Documents revealed that the Developer made payment to Authority for electric at a much later date -- The plea of Force Majeure circumstances does not stand – Award for registration in favour of the complainant along the penal interest and compensation.

Consumer Protection Act, 1986; S.24A – Limitation to lodge consumer complaint – Delay of more than two years since arising of cause of action – Held: after accepting almost the entire consideration amount it is bounden duty on the part of developer/builder to deliver possession and to execute the sale deed and unless it is done, the cause of action is a continuous one.

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; S. 13 ----- whether a false allegation of impotency is an act of cruelty to create a ground for divorce ----- Held: the unproved allegations of the wife that the husband was impotent for about six to seven months from the marriage was rightly weighed by the Family Court to hold that the wife had treated the husband with cruelty by making false and baseless allegations against him ----- no husband would like to hear that he was impotent for about 6 to 7 months after the marriage, if that was not true ----- Divorce granted in favour of the husband.

Practice and Procedure – Order obtained by fraud – Suppression of execution of two deeds before the Court – Held: Non-production and even non-mentioning of the release deed at the trial is tantamount to playing fraud on the court -- A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation -- If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party – Order so obtained set aside.