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Indian Succession Act, 1925; Ss. 281, 282 -- Whether execution of will in English can be doubted on ground that testator was not knowing English language ----- Held: The lack of knowledge of English even if can be attributed to the testator would not fundamentally alter the 14 Page 15 situation inasmuch as before registration of the Will the contents thereof can be understood to have been explained to the testator or ascertained from her by the Sub Registrar, who had deposed that such a practice is normally adhered to.

Indian Succession Act, 1925; -- Loss of original Will ----- Held: The stand of the plaintiff that the original Will was lost while in the custody of her mother and her knowledge of such loss on the day of her mother’s death cannot be disbelieved merely because no report in this regard was lodged before the police.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S. 125- Maintenance claim by wife ----- Entitlement if Divorce decree has been passed in favour of husband on the ground of cruelty ------ A Divorce was passed in favour of the husband not only on the ground of cruelty and desertion but also on the ground of wife living in adultery. It was held that so far as the liability of the husband for the payment not only of the future maintenance but even in regard to the arrear of maintenance was concerned, the husband would not be liable to pay the same;

Hindu Succession Act, 1956; -- Whether illegitimate son/daughter does not succeed his/her mother's property -- The normal rule of construction of the words "child" "son" or "daughter" in a statute would include only legitimate children. No doubt, there might be express provision in the statute itself to give these words a more extended meaning as to include also illegitimate children and s. 3(j) of the Hindu Succession Act (Act XXX of 1956) furnishes a good illustration of such a provision. It might even be that without an express provision in that regard the context might indicate That the words were used in a more comprehensive sense as indicating merely a blood relationship apart from the question of legitimacy. Section 15 contains no express provision and the context, so far as it goes, is not capable of lending any support to such a construction. In the first place, the words "Son or daughter" occur more than once in that section. It was fairly conceded on behalf of the appellant that where the son or daughter of a male vendor is referred to, as in s. 15 (1), the words mean only the legitimate issue of the vendor. If so, it cannot be that in the case of a female vendor the words could have a different connotation. Even taking the case of a female vendor herself, there is a reference in s. 15(2)(a)(i) to the brother’s son of such vendor. It could hardly be argued that a brother’s illegitimate son is comprehended within those words. Therefore, it must be held that when s. 15(2)(b)(i) uses the words "son or daughter" it meant only a legitimate son and legitimate daughter of the female vendor.

Limitation to file claim for due maintenance – Considering the peculiar circumstances of the case the Court held that the bar under Section 125(3) cannot be applied

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S. 156 (3) ----- Further investigation --- -- Held: on receipt of the report, before taking cognizance of the offence alleged, may direct further investigation under sub-Section (3) of Section 156 Cr.P.C. and require the police to make further report and that such power can be exercised suo motu, contingent on its satisfaction of the necessity thereof to espouse the cause of justice. (Para 27)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S. 156(3) ---- Whether a judicial Magistrate, after taking cognizance of an offence, on the basis of a police report and after appearance of the accused in pursuance of the process issued, can order of its own, further investigation ----- Held: the Magistrate of his own, cannot order further investigation after the accused had entered appearance pursuant to a process issued to him subsequent to the taking of the cognizance by him. (Para 31)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S. 173(8) ----- Whether, after the chargesheet had been filed by the investigating agency under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C, and charge had been framed against some of the accused persons on the basis thereof, and other co-accused had been discharged, the Magistrate could direct the investigating agency to conduct a re-investigation or further investigation under sub-Section (8) of Section 173 ----- Held: after taking cognizance of an offence on the basis of a police report and after the appearance of the accused, a Magistrate cannot of its own order further investigation, though such an order could be passed on the application of the investigating authority ----- the power of the investigating officer to make a prayer for conducting further investigation in terms of Section 173(8) of the Code was not taken away only because a charge-sheet had been filed under Section 173(2) and a further investigation was permissible even if cognizance had been taken by the Magistrate ----- once a charge-sheet was filed under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C and either charges have been framed or the accused have been discharged, the Magistrate may on the basis of a protest petition, take cognizance of the offence complained of or on the application made by the investigating authority, permit further investigation under Section 173(8), but he cannot suo motu direct a further investigation or order a re-investigation into a case on account of the bar of Section 167(2) of the Code. (Para 32, 33)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S. 173(8) ----- Whether in exercise of powers under Section 173 Cr.P.C, the Trial Court has the jurisdiction to ignore any of the police reports, where there was more than one, whether by the same or different investigating agencies submitted in furtherance of the orders of a Court ----- Held: the investigating agency was thus competent to file a report supplementary to its primary report and that the former was to be treated by the Court in continuation of the latter. (Para 36)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S. 173 ----- Whether Magistrate can direct further investigation either suo moto or on the prayer of the informant after the final report had been submitted, cognizance had been taken, accused had appeared, and trial is underway ----- Held: that though the investigating agency concerned has been invested with the power to undertake further investigation desirably after informing the Court thereof, before which it had submitted its report and obtaining its approval, no such power is available therefor to the learned Magistrate after cognizance has been taken on the basis of the earlier report, process has been issued and accused has entered appearance in response thereto. At that stage, neither the learned Magistrate suo motu nor on an application filed by the complainant/informant direct further investigation. Such a course would be open only on the request of the investigating agency and that too, in circumstances warranting further investigation on the detection of material evidence only to secure fair investigation and trial, the life purpose of the adjudication in hand ----- Though the Magistrate has the power to direct investigation under Section 156(3) at the pre-cognizance stage even after a charge-sheet or a closure report is submitted, once cognizance is taken and the accused person appears pursuant thereto, he would be bereft of any competence to direct further investigation either suo motu or acting on the request or prayer of the complainant/informant.

Words and Phrases ----- Investigation, Further Investigation and De novo Investigation ----- Held: Whereas initial investigation was alluded to be one conducted in furtherance of registration of an FIR leading to a final report under Section 173(2) of the Code, further investigation was a phenomenon where the investigating officer would obtain further oral or documentary evidence after the final report had already been submitted, so much so that the report on the basis of the subsequent disclosures/discoveries by way of such evidence would be in consolidation and in continuation of the previous investigation and the report yielded thereby. “Fresh investigation” “reinvestigation” “de novo investigation”, however is an exercise, which it was held, could neither be undertaken by the investigating agency suo motu nor could be ordered by the Magistrate and that it was essentially within the domain of the higher judiciary to direct the same and that too under limited compelling circumstances warranting such probe to ensure a just and fair investigation and trial. (Para 39)

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; S. 26 – Whether earning mother has any liability towards maintenance of the child -- As much the obligation of the father to maintain a minor child as that of the mother -- It is not the law that how affluent mother may be it is the obligation only of the father to maintain the minor.

Limitation Act, 1963; S. 6 and 8; Limitation Act, 1963; Art. 60 -- The starting point of limitation is the attaining of majority by the ward and the period of limitation is three years -- the alienation was effected in 1953 and the period of 12 years should be calculated from that date. Section 6 of the Limitation Act provides that a person entitled to institute a suit is at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor, he may institute the suit within the same period after the disability has ceased, as would otherwise has been allowed from the time specified therefore in the third column of the schedule. Section 8 provides that nothing in Section 6 applies to suits to enforce rights of pre-emptions, or shall be deemed to extend for more than three years from the cessation of the disability, the period of limitation for any suit.

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; S. 8 -----
Consumer Protection Act, 1986; ------- Whether presence of Arbitration clause in the agreement oust the jurisdiction of Consumer Forum ----- Observation of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission by holding that Arbitration clause in the agreement cannot circumscribe the jurisdiction of a Consumer For a notwithstanding the amendments made to Section 8 of the Arbitration Act.

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; S. 13 ----- whether a false allegation of adultery levelled by one spouse against the other leads to a conclusion that the said spouse has been treated with mental cruelty or not ----- Held: it has been held by this Court that unfounded allegations of adultery consists of cruelty. The marriage is a trust between the male and female partner and if irresponsible allegations are levelled by the spouse against each other, it will be held that the spouse when makes reckless allegations without any basis, does so, at his/her own risk and responsibility ----- It has been further held that levelling of false allegations by the wife to the extent that her husband was leading an adulterous life is an act of cruelty and even a single act of cruelty after marriage is a valid ground for divorce.

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; S. 13B ------ Out of marital dispute the wife filed case under section 406/498A IPC and also under the provisions of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence 2005 ----- Later both the parties entered into compromise, husband paid Rs.5 lakhs to the wife towards Alimony, and filed Petition for Mutual Divorce ----- After six months of filing the wife remained absent, then on 11.03.2008 filed application for exemption from appearance on 12.03.2008 and later filed application that she does not want to proceed with the Mutual Divorce Case ----- Trial Court dismissed the petition for Mutual Divorce ----- Appeal thereagainst ----- Held: Court is fully satisfied that the consent given by both the parties for obtaining the decree of divorce by mutual consent was free and fair consent and was not obtained by force, fraud or undue influence ----- Court is further satisfied that the alleged withdrawal of the consent by the respondent wife in the first instance on 29/5/2008 was not genuine and was merely with a view to extort more money from the appellant husband ----- the application for exemption from her appearance on 12.03.2008 should be treated as her consent for mutual divorce ----- nothing prevented the court below to proceed to pass divorce decree by mutual consent on 12.03.2008 ------ Appeal allowed ----- Divorce Decree by mutual consent has been granted.