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Evidence Act, 1872; S. 27 – Confessional statement -- Applicable only if the confessional statement leads to the discovery of some new fact – The material objects which the police is claimed to have recovered from the accused may well have been planted by the police, the bench said -- the settled legal proposition that Section 27 of the Evidence Act is applicable only if the confessional statement leads to the discovery of some new fact while setting aside the conviction in a murder case

Code of Criminal Procedure, S. 125, 126; ------- Territorial Jurisdiction to file case for maintenance ------- Regarding the place of institution and adjudication of the maintenance proceeding, it is indicated therein that such proceeding can be taken against any person in any district, inter alia, where the wife resides ---
-- The word ‘reside’ means to live or to have a dwelling place or an abode and is not equivalent to something in the nature of having a domicile in a particular
place or having a place as the place of origin or the place where the family used to live ----- The words ‘where he or his wife resides’ in section 126(1)(b) of the
Code has been interpreted to mean not only domicile in the technical sense of that word but also something more than a flying visit to or a casual stay in a particular place contemplating animus manendi or an intention to stay for a period. The length of the period is dependent upon the circumstances of each case ------ Thus a person ‘resides’ in a place if he/she through choice makes it his/her abode permanently or temporarily and whether he/she has chosen to make a particular place his/her abode or not depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case ----- The territorial jurisdiction is to be determined on the date of filing the application. Even if the wife resides at a place temporarily on the date of filing of the application under section 125 Cr.P.C., the concerned Court within whose territorial jurisdiction she is residing, can entertain such application. (Para 7);

Evidence Act, 1872; ----- Whether Whatsapp forward can be treated as document as per Evidence Act ----- Held: Annexure - A does not even qualify as a document in terms of the Evidence Act, 1872, in as much as, neither the original nor the copy of the original has been produced. It is an admitted position that the petitioners have not seen original and have had no occasion to even compare Annexure - A with the original.

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; S. 138/147 ----- Compounding of offence punishable under section 138 N. I. Act ----- The Accused offered cheque amount along with interest in accordance with the judgment of Damodar S. Prabhu vs Sayed Babalal H. (LU Mar 15) 2018 has not been accepted by the complainant on the pretext that the complainant is entitled to more amount beyond the amount of cheque for having been unnecessarily harassed ----- Held: the proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act cannot be permitted to be used as a trump card to earn interest in the garb of prosecution -----bonafide of an accused, who offer the amount of cheque in dispute in proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act cannot be ignored ----- Direction that the personal appearance of the accused may be exempted if the cheque amount along with interest is paid in accordance with the Damodar S. Prabhu vs Sayed Babalal H. (LU Mar 15) 2018 ------ evidence can be recorded in the presence of counsel for the petitioner by exempting his personal appearance.

Evidence Act, 1872; S. 65B (2) – Electronic record -- Specified conditions --
(i) The electronic record containing the information should have been produced by the computer during the period over which the same was regularly used to
store or process information for the purpose of any activity regularly carried on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of that computer;
(ii) The information of the kind contained in electronic record or of the kind from which the information is derived was regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activity;
(iii) During the material part of the said period, the computer was operating properly and that even if it was not operating properly for some time, the break or breaks had not affected either the record or the accuracy of its contents; and (iv) The information contained in the record should be a reproduction or derivation from the information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activity.;

Evidence Act, 1872; S. 65B (4) – Electronic record -- Conditions to be fulfilled --
(a) There must be a certificate which identifies the electronic record containing the statement;
(b) The certificate must describe the manner in which the electronic record was produced;
(c) The certificate must furnish the particulars of the device involved in the production of that record;
(d) The certificate must deal with the applicable conditions mentioned under Section 65B(2) of the Evidence Act; and
(e) The certificate must be signed by a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device.

Evidence Act, 1872; S. 65B (4) – Electronic record – Certificate -- The person issuing certificate needed only to state in the certificate that the same is to the best of his knowledge and belief -- Such a certificate must accompany the electronic record like computer printout, Compact Disc (CD), Video Compact Disc (VCD), pen drive, etc., pertaining to which a statement is sought to be given in evidence, when the same is produced in evidence.

Evidence Act, 1872; S. 65B (4) – Electronic record -- If an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act, the same is admissible in evidence, without compliance of the conditions in Section 65B of the Evidence Act.

Evidence Act, 1872; S. 65 (C) and (f) – Admissibility of public document – Secondary evidence of content of document when the original public document is lost or destroyed – Held: Under S. 65 clauses (a) and (c) secondary evidence was admissible -- It is held that a case may fall both under clauses (a) or (c) and (f) in which case secondary evidence would be admis-sible. It was held that clauses (a) and (c) were independent of clause (f) and even an ordinary copy would, therefore, be admissible -- As stated above the case that the original was no longer available in Court records and the certified copy was lost has not been disbelieved -- Thus the ordinary copy of the earlier judgment was admissible in evidence and had been correctly marked as an exhibit by the trial court.

Passport Act, 1967; S. 10(3) (C ) –
Constitution of India; Art. 19 and 21 --
Facts of the Case : Maneka Gandhi was issued a passport on 1/06/1976 under the Passport Act 1967. The regional passport officer, New Delhi, issued a letter dated 2/7/1977 addressed to Maneka Gandhi, in which she was asked to surrender her passport under section 10(3)(c)of the Act in public interest, within 7 days from the date of receipt of the letter.

Maneka Gandhi immediately wrote a letter to the Regional Passport officer, New Delhi seeking in return a copy of the statement of reasons for such order. However, the government of India, Ministry of External Affairs refused to produce any such reason in the interest of general public. Later, a writ petition was filed by Maneka Gandhi under Article 32 of the Constitution in the Supreme Court challenging the order of the government of India as violating her fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:
1. Whether right to go abroad is a part of right to personal liberty under Article 21.
2. Whether the Passport Act prescribes a ‘procedure’ as required by Article 21 before depriving a person from the right guaranteed under the said article.
3. Whether section 10(3)(c) of the Passport Act is violative of Article 14,19(1) (a) and 21 of the constitution.
4. Whether the impugned order of the Regional passport officer is in contravention of the principle of natural justice.

Judgement and the Guidelines Issued:
>> To the extent to which section 10(3)(c) of the Passport Act, 1967 authorizes the passport authority to impound a passport “in the interest of the general public”, it violates Article 14 as it confers vague and undefined power on the passport authority.
>> Section 10(3)(c) is void as conferring an arbitrary power as it doesn’t provide for a hearing to the holder of the passport before the passport is impounded.
>> Section 10(3)(c) is violative of Article as does not prescribe ‘procedure’ within the meaning of that article and the procedure practiced is worst.
>> Section 10(3)(c) is against Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) since it permits restrictions to be imposed on the rights guaranteed by these articles even though such restrictions cannot be imposed under articles 19(2) and 19(6).
>> A new doctrine of post decisional theory was evolved.
>> One of the significant interpretation in this case is the discovery of inter connections between the three Articles- Article 14, 19 and 21.
>> This law which prescribes a procedure for depriving a person of “personal liberty” has to fulfill the requirements of Articles 14 and 19 also.
>> It was finally held by the court that the right to travel and go outside the country is included in the right to personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21.
>> The rule was an enabling law which must also be “just, fair and reasonable”.

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; S. 13 ----- whether a false allegation of adultery levelled by one spouse against the other leads to a conclusion that the said spouse has been treated with mental cruelty or not ----- Held: it has been held by this Court that unfounded allegations of adultery consists of cruelty. The marriage is a trust between the male and female partner and if irresponsible allegations are levelled by the spouse against each other, it will be held that the spouse when makes reckless allegations without any basis, does so, at his/her own risk and responsibility ----- It has been further held that levelling of false allegations by the wife to the extent that her husband was leading an adulterous life is an act of cruelty and even a single act of cruelty after marriage is a valid ground for divorce.

Supreme Court observed: where the Court dealing with a matter is satisfied that a case is made out to waive the statutory period under Section 13B(2), it can do so after considering the following : i) the statutory period of six months specified in Section 13B(2), in addition to the statutory period of one year under Section 13B(1) of separation of parties is already over before the first motion itself; ii) all efforts for mediation/conciliation including efforts in terms of Order XXXIIA Rule 3 CPC/Section 23(2) of the Act/Section 9 of the Family Courts Act to reunite the parties have failed and there is no likelihood of success in that direction by any further efforts; iii) the parties have genuinely settled their differences including alimony, custody of child or any other pending issues between the parties; iv) the waiting period will only prolong their agony. Amardeep Singh vs Harveen Kaur

Constitution of India; Art. 14 and 21 -- Recognition of third gender –

Held: the Court upheld transgender persons’ right to self-identify their gender. The Constitution requires equal treatment of all people regardless of their gender identity or expression. The Court declared that the Centre and State governments must grant legal recognition of gender identity as male, female or third gender. A full recognition is to be given even in the absence of any existing statutory regime. Additionally, the Court declared that educational, social and health care issues faced by transgender people must be addressed both at the centre and state government levels.